Praise for Russ Feingold.

In my zeal to connect the historical dots, my article on the abominable FISA Renewal forgot to mention that on this topic Wisconsin can be proud of its junior Senator, Russ Feingold.

On the immorality of warrantless searches, the immorality of secret evidence presented in star chambers, and the immorality of ex post facto immunity, there has been no greater, vocal, or articulate critic of this destruction of the rule of law than Senator Russ Feingold.

I often don't agree with the policies of Senator Feingold. That all the more reason to praise him when he gets it right and more importantly gets it right for the correct reasons.

I am deeply sorry I have not given Feingold the praise he deserves on this topic and I am greatful my friend Paul for reminding of my lapse.

On the FISA renewal and its unwinding of our lawful Republic into an lawless empire, Russ Feingold got it right, got it right for the correct reasons, and, most important, fought against this abomination to the American character with all of his effort.

Thank you Senator Feingold. On the matter of FISA, you have made this Wisconsinite proud to call you my Senator.

Yes, Virginia, A Search Warrant Is Required.

Back in January, 2008, I raised the question on Boots and Sabers: Do building inspectors need search warrants.

I discovered late last week that the Village of Germantown did a warrantless search of my property back in August of 2007. The Village used the ruse of an inspection as the color of law under which the warrantless search was done. The Village agent claims to have not entered my house or out-buildings, but just walked about on the premises as if he owned it. When I asked him to see a copy of the search warrant he obtained prior to entering my property, his answer was, "I don't need a search warrant". Once the subject of warrants came up, his memory of exact dates and times became fuzzy.

Now that the question is not philosophical, but practical, I did some research. It turns out the Village did need a type of non-criminal search warrant called a Special Inspection Warrant. The requirements for a when a Special Inspection Warrant is needed and how to obtain one is found in Wis Stats. 66.0119.

As an aside, since Wis Stats. 66.0119 defines inspectors of any type as "peace officers" does that mean inspectors of any type can carried concealed weapons under 941.23?

So, yesterday, Friday, July 18, 2008, I did what little I could to put the Village on notice that in my little corner of the Village I believe the state constitution is the supreme law of the land and is the authority under which the Village derives its just powers. I did so by delivering a Notice of Denial of Permission to Inspect to the 4 departments most likely to hold the attitude: "We are inspectors. We don't need Warrants.". These are the Village Inspections (Chief and assistant inspector), Village DPW, Village Treasurer (both Treasure and the apprasier), and the Village Clerk (as the Village record keeper).

I am not naive enough to believe that Federal, State, or Local governments are going to let Rights, Constitutions, or statutes interfere with something as vital as confiscating money from the serfs and calling it tax revenue. But, I do believe the point of the fourth amendment to the US Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin State Constitution is not about hiding things, but is all about making tyranny inconvienient for tyrants, be they tyrants of the Federal, State, or local strain.

But, if the Constitution is not to be practiced at home, then it is dead and so is the Republic for which it stood.

FISA Renewal: Hamilton and the Federalist are Proven Wrong yet again

In 1787, Alexander Hamilton got his wish. For seven years he harangued people claiming the government of the United States was too weak. The US government under our first constitution was too weak even though it was powerful enough to defeat the world's greatest power of the time (Great Britain). In May 1787, Hamilton got his wish. A constitutional convention was called to make minor amendments to the then current constitution, The Articles of Confederation. Once convened, Hamilton unveiled his true intentions. He proposed a President elected for life, who in turn would appoint state governors. The governors would have un-reviewable veto power over any state legislation (i.e. no voting to override gubernatorial vetoes). Hamilton’s plan was for "an energetic Executive" in order to make the United States a "great" nation like Britain instead of a country like Switzerland which had no influence on European affairs. His plan was dismissed with the first hour. If you would like to read more on Hamilton's plans for a "Great America" see the books at the end of this article.

The minor amendment proposed by Hamilton's Convention was an amendment by substitution. That substitution was our second and current Constitution (without a bill of rights).

The resulting debate on abandoning a successful government organized as a Swiss/Iroquois confederacy or adopting a nationalized, central government was spirited, vigorous, wide ranging, and many times bitterly personal.

For those interested in this point counter point exchange of pamphlets, editorials, letters, and ratification debates, there is no better source than The Debate on the Constitution.

When I first read this book, I was struck by three things:

1. These men were prescient. With two hundred years on my side, I was able to judge the merits of the arguments offered and the fears articulated.


2. The opponents of the new Constitution (the anti-federalists) were almost always right


3. The proponents of the new Constitution (the Federalists Jay, Madison, and Hamilton) were almost always wrong

Every dire consequence predicted by the opponents of the Constitution has come to pass.
These predictions include:

• civil war as one faction uses the new, central government to dominate other factions,
• that the "General Welfare" and the "Proper and Necessary" clauses would be used as justification for unlimited legislative action,
• That taxes on liquor and hard cider would lead to insurrection, and
• that the Supreme Court will remake the government into any shape the court dictates because the power of this court is in many cases superior to that of the legislature.

Every rationale offered by the Hamilton and his comrades as to why these dire consequences were phantoms of over heated imaginations has been rebuked by actual history.

With the passage of the FISA renewal yesterday, the constitutional opponent, Centinel, has been proved correct.

On October 5, 1787, in Anti-Federalist paper 47, CENTINEL of Philadelphia, predicted: And from his [the President's] power of granting pardons, he might skreen [sic] from punishment the most treasonable attempts on liberties of the people. This argument was gaining enough traction (and derailing ratification), that Hamilton penned Federalist No. 74 in March 25, 1788 to specifically counter the arguments advanced by Centinel.

The warrantless wiretapping program begun by Bill Clinton in 1995 and completed by George Bush in February 2001 is laid out in this time line. Bill Clinton's program to have the telecoms perform wireless wiretaps was a continuation of his 1993 Clipper Chip program designed to make all private telephone conversations illegal within the US. It is clear that when the Clipper Chip initiative failed, Bill Clinton proceeded to plan B; Warrantless wiretapping via telecommunication companies.

The most effective propaganda on this subject is the LIE that the warrantless wiretapping program begun by President Clinton in the 90's and completed by President Bush in February 2001 is a post-September 11, 2001 anti-terrorism program. God, we are gullible.

Since December, 1999, the Telecoms were assured by the NSA and the White House that they would be "taken care of" and "protected" should the program be discovered. Exactly as Centinel predicted two hundred years ago, the President and the Senate have colluded to use pardoning powers in order to skreen from punishment the most treasonable attempts on liberties of the people

Not all Telecoms though participated in this treasonable attempt on liberties of the people. In February 2001, one Telecomm company, Qwest, refused and demanded the US Government produce one of those pesky warrant things. Given the Government reaction, Qwest may have even been so bold as to demand the warrant actually be signed and in an act of utter imputence may have further demanded the warrant be signed by an actual Judge. We are told that Qwest's inability to get government contracts for the next two years was unconnected to their refusal to participate. The official story is that the prosecution of Qwest CEO, Joseph Nacchio, for securities fraud (begun on or before March 2003 and was brought to court in March 2006) was unconnected to Qwest's refusal to participate in a treasonable attempt on liberties of the people. The official stories here may even be true, but we will never know. The fact remains that Nacchio was denied the opportunity present this evidence to a jury during his trial. The discussion of the 2001 NSA upgrade contract and its financial impact on the company was central to his defense.

The opponents of the second and current Constitution (the Anti-Federalist) are proven correct yet again and Hamilton and the Federalist are proven wrong yet again. Exactly as Centinel predicted two hundred years ago, the President and the Congress have and will collude to use pardoning powers in order to entice to action and then to screen from punishment private agents willing to execute their treasonable attempts on liberties of the people.

Thomas Jefferson, Sam Adams, Patrick Henry, Centinel, Brutus, An Old Whig, A Federal Farmer, and the other other opponents of our second and current constitution held the view that Government Power and Individual Liberty were a zero-sum game. To the extent one waxes, the other wanes. With the star chambers of FISA and with the introduction of retroactive immunity, Government Power waxes hard and we, the gullible, modernist sheep, reject the the deep wisdom of our forefathers to think that Individual Liberty has not waned

Long Live Hamilton's EmpireRepublic.


Book's on Hamilton:
Hamilton's Republic
Hamilton and the Constitution
Hamilton's Curse

Voting System Standards: All Form and No Substance

I have been a long time critic of the 2002 Voting System Standards (2002 VSS) and of the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (2005 VVSG). In fact, both sets of standards are virtually worthless. There are two reasons for this. First, the requirements enumerated in the standards are, in and of themselves, much too weak for something as vital as administering an election. Second, both sets of standards have an explicit loophole that allows almost all the requirements — weak as they are — to be ignored. This second objection was first brought to my attention two years ago by Howard Stanislevic.

We now have proof that this loophole is used by the labs in order to “pass” systems that don’t meet the standards. In the most recent certification test report submitted to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), SysTest labs (one of the labs accredited by the EAC and the NIST) recommended certification for a voting system. SysTest recommended the system certification even though their findings showed 79 specific failures to meet the standards.

As you read this article, keep in mind that the standards actually allow 77 of these 79 failures to be ignored!

Last February, SysTest labs wrote its certification test report for a new voting system manufactured by Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold). The report listed the 79 problems the lab found during testing. Even so, SysTest recommended the system be certified by the EAC. Section 6 from the test report reads:

SysTest Labs has successfully completed the testing of Premier’s Assure 1.2 voting system. It has been determined that Assure 1.2 successfully met the required criteria of the Federal Election Commission Voting System Standards April 2002.

Based on testing scope and results, as detailed in this report, it is SysTest Labs’ recommendation that the EAC committee grant certification of Premier’s Assure 1.2 voting system.

I sent a letter to the EAC objecting to this recommendation for certification — not because of the 77 “acceptable” failures, but because of the two failures that require denial of certification.

The test report reads like the problem log maintained by VotersUnite! and contains the following 79 “findings”:

1. Functional, Accufeed will not feed ballots (Finding #1 page 38)
2. Doc, Batch Start card is not rejected (Finding #2 page 38)
3. Functional, Batteries are not functioning (Finding #1 on page 39)
4. Functional, BallotStation is not accepting voter access cards (Finding #5 on page 45)
5. Functional, TSX looping with use of AVPM ll (Finding #6 on page 45)
6. Doc, Housing door does not fit over the canister (Finding #7 on page 45)
7. Doc, Provisional votes flow from the BallotStations up to GEMS is not clear (first Finding #4 on page 45)
8. Doc, User's Guide does not list the limitations of the VCE (Finding #8 on page 45)
9. Doc, VCE does NOT save loaded data unless POSITION 1 is loaded (Finding #9 on page 45)
10. Doc, Statement in #1 is incorrect and may need to be removed (Finding #10 on page 45 – note, this item references the following one)
11. Doc, Section 3.1 references out of date (first Finding #1 on page 45)
12. Functional, The AVPM I and II print modules are not operating (first Finding #2 on page 45)
13. Functional, Ballot Station freezes (second Finding #1 on page 45)
14. Doc, Doc does not provide information on Recall/Retain type C (second Finding #2 on page 45)
15. Doc, Installing and Removing the OSAA (Finding #3 on page 45 – note, this finding and other below are not explained)
16. Functional, Build failed, “failed to verify file” (second Finding #4 on page 45)
17. Doc, Section 8.3: Adding and Editing an Audio file (first Finding #2 on page 52 - unexplained)
18. Doc, Section 14.4: Exporting Required Translations (first Finding #3 on page 52 - unexplained)
19. Doc, Section 5.3: Importing Election Data into AIMS (Finding #4 on page 52 - unexplained)
20. Doc, Section 15.1: Importing Text Translations (Finding #5 on page 52 - unexplained)
21. Doc, Section 4.1: Getting Started (Finding #6 on page 52 - unexplained)
22. Doc, Section 4.2: Logging On (Finding #7 on page 52 - unexplained)
23. Info, Section 5.1: Setting Up a New Election in AIMS (Finding #8 on page 52 - unexplained)
24. Info, Section 5.1: Setting Up a New Election in AIMS (Finding #9 on page 52 - unexplained)
25. Doc, Section 5.1: Setting Up a New Election in AIMS (Finding #10 on page 52 - unexplained)
26. Doc, Section 5.3.1: Importing Diebold GEMS Data (Finding #11 on page 52 - unexplained)
27. Doc, Section 12.8: Languages (Finding #12 on page 52 - unexplained)
28. Doc, Section 12.8: Languages (Finding #13 on page 52 - unexplained)
29. Doc, Section 6.1: Removing the Ink Cartridge (Finding #1 on page 52 - unexplained)
30. Doc, Section 6.5.3: Setting the Admin Password (second Finding #2 on page 52 - unexplained)
31. Doc, Section 6.5.1: Printing the Operation Log (second Finding #3 on page 52 - unexplained)
32. Doc, Section 1.5: Assisting the Voter who uses an AT Device (first Finding #4 on page 53)
33. Functional, Audio script does not match text script (Finding #5 on page 53)
34. Functional, Ballot title not voiced on 2nd race screen (Finding #6 on page 53)
35. Doc, Section 1.3: Using the AutoMARK VAT with an AT Device (Finding #7 on page 53 - unexplained)
36. Doc, instructions/procedures are not provided (first Finding #8 on page 53)
37. Doc, Flash Memory Card the Pin # is not provided in the doc (first Finding #9 on page 53)
38. Doc, Japanese text for 'Write-in' different than what was input (first Finding #10 on page 53)
39. Functional, Both Chinese languages have the same text on select button (first Finding #11 on page 53)
40. Functional, Voting Instructions are not translated (Finding #3 on page 53)
41. Functional, Audio is not provided when voting with a UAID device (Not Supported) (second Finding #4 on page 53)
42. Doc, Issues with foreign fonts (second Finding #8 on page 53)
43. Doc, Section 4 - The listed fonts do not cover all Vietnamese characters (second Finding #9 on page 53)
44. Functional, Cannot select the Contrast or Large Text buttons with the Keypad on the R6 (second Finding #10 on page 53)
45. Functional, No visual cue for every error-type audio cue (second Finding #11 on page 53)
46. Doc, Section 12.1.3 of Appendix D is incorrect (Finding #12 on page 53)
47. Functional, 6 and the 4 keys on the keypad do not function as described (Finding #13 on page 53)
48. Informational, dB levels of 113-115 were consistently measured. (Finding #14 on page 53)
49. Functional, A tenth language is not selectable via the keypad device (Finding #15 on page 53)
50. Functional, Report was not found to exist (Finding #2 on page 53)
51. Functional, Error message when attempting to connect to Assure Security Service Host (first Finding #1 on page 59)
52. Doc, Missing information in the documentation on how to create the MDB file (second Finding #1 on page 59)
53. Functional, OSX unit allowed a blank ballot w/no message (third Finding #1 on page 59)
54. Doc, Document does not contain enough info to resolve the errors (first Finding #2 on page 59)
55. Functional, OSX unit failed when attempting to download via modem (first Finding #3 on page 59)
56. Functional, Central Scan application failed to open the system audit log (fourth Finding #1 on page 59)
57. Functional, Error can't connect to the security service host (second Finding #2 on page 59)
58. Doc, (discrepancy is not valid) (second Finding #3 on page 59)
59. Functional, users and roles that were assigned in the Access Control window are lost (first Finding #4 on page 59)
60. Functional, documentation does not specify how the user is notified when the Vote Center is finished loading (Finding #5 on page 59)
61. Functional, Users and Rolls lost that were assigned in the Access Control window (Finding #6 on page 59)
62. Functional, Messages block user from being able to run PCS (Finding #7 on page 59)
63. Doc, Unable to use “Next card” and “Previous card” buttons (Finding #8 on page 59)
64. Functional, Message – “workspace could not be opened” (Finding #9 on page 59)
65. Doc, VCE requires a commercial off the shelf (COTS), (fifth Finding #1 on page 59)
66. Doc, Voter Card Encoder does not have an ENTER button (third Finding #2 on page 59)
67. Doc, Acceptance Test do not match the steps for encoding a voter access card (third Finding #3 on page 59)
68. Doc, Prompts stated in the user’s guide match do not match VCE (third Finding #4 on page 59)
69. Doc, User’s guide does not explain what a master voter access card is (Finding #5 on page 60)
70. Doc, User’s guide does not provide clear and detailed steps on how to overwrite a ballot key (Finding #6 on page 60)
71. Doc, No explanation of how to create a master voter access card (Finding #7 on page 60)
72. Functional, GEMSVoterCardData.txt file disappears (Finding #1 on page 64)
73. Doc, GEMS documentation does not specify how to setup a Blanket Open Primary (Finding #3 on page 69)
74. Functional, Exception error was encountered (Finding #4 on page 69)
75. Functional, 2.0.1 users guide is shown. The installed software is the 2.0.4 (Finding #6 on page 74)
76. Doc, Automark System Installation and Maintenance Guide procedures not adequate (Finding #1 on page 82)
77. Doc, AutoMARK 3010 Poll Worker's Guide, no indication for message "Alert! (Finding #3 on page 82)
78. HW, Unit inoperable; caused loss of data from the operations log (Finding #2 on page 82)
79. Info, Changes in the total printed count in the operations log on the ATS VAT can be caused by abnormal shutdown (Finding #4 on page 82)

Except for the last two findings on this list, there is nothing that would prevent ANY NIST-accredited test lab from recommending this system for certification by the EAC. None of the 2002 VSS requirements violated by the first 77 findings are enforceable requirements!

Some definitions are in order.

• A requirement is a declarative statement of the form "The system shall..." or a declarative statement of the form "The system shall not..." . Two example requirements from the 2002 VSS are:
  • From section 2.2.2.1a of Volume I of the 2002 VSS: To ensure vote accuracy, all systems shall record the election contests, candidates, and issues exactly as defined by election officials;.
  • From paragraph 5.7.2d of Volume I of the 2002 VSS: the telecommunications components of a voting system shall notify the user of the successful or unsuccessful completion of the data transmission.
• An enforceable requiremen t is a requirement such that if the requirement is not met, then the system cannot be certified.

There are almost no enforceable requirements in either the 2002 VSS or the 2005 VVSG. This is because both standards have a conformance exception clause (loophole) which covers nearly every requirement listed in either standard. The exemption paragraph is found in section B.5 of Appendix B of Volume II of the 2002 VSS and the 2005 VVSG . From the 2002 VSS, paragraph B.5 reads [emphasis mine]:

Of note, any uncorrected deficiency that does not involve the loss or corruption of voting data shall not necessarily be cause for rejection. Deficiencies of this type may include failure to fully achieve the levels of performance specified in Volume I, Sections 3 and 4 of the Standards, or failure to fully implement formal programs for qualify [sic] assurance and configuration management described in Volume I, Sections 7 and 8. The nature of the deficiency is described in detail sufficient to support the recommendation either to accept or to reject the system, and the recommendation is based on consideration of the probable effect the deficiency will have on safe and efficient system operation during all phases of election use.

The first 77 of the 79 uncorrected deficiencies listed above fit within the conformance exemption (loophole) defined in both sets of standards. Some of these 77 violations are also violations of federal law, and yet they are allowed by the standards. For example:

• Findings 33-49 (in my list above) demonstrate that the system under test fails to conform to the accessibility requirements for blind voters and the accessibility requirement for some foreign language voters. This means the system violates Section 301(a)(3) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). See page 3 of the EAC advisory on compliance with this section of HAVA.

  
  

• Non-conformance 72 involves the destruction of an election record. The destruction of an election record used in a federal election prior to 22 months after that election is a felony under Title 42, Chapter 20, Subchapter II, § 1974.

But, since none of these specific 18 non-conformances nor 59 of the remaining 61 non-conformances involve vote loss or corruption of voting data, none of them prevents the lab from recommending certification.

The last two finding involve the corruption or loss of voting data. So, even with the loophole of paragraph B.5, the system cannot be recommended for certification. SysTest erred when it recommended the system for certification, but only because the voting system was so broken that even the B.5 loophole would not allow the system to be recommended for certification.

SysTest’s report demonstrates that with the broad nature of the loophole found in paragraph B.5, there is almost no failure that would prevent a system from being certified by the EAC, or that would have prevented qualification under the previous NASED/ITA program . So, it should come as no surprise to anyone that we read about failure after failure, in election after election, by voting systems “certified” by the NASED Voting Systems Board .

The 2002 VSS and 2005 VVSG are made toothless because of the conformance exemption found in paragraph B.5. But, as broad and eviscerating as the loophole is, it is not a blanket exemption.

The report I examined was written by SysTest about a Premier/Diebold system. But, the problems with the 2002 VSS and 2005 VVSG apply to systems from all vendors, not just Premier/Diebold, and they apply to all of the NIST-accredited test labs, not just SysTest. SysTest found 79 non-conformances to the 2002 VSS, 18 of which also violate federal law. But, because of the loophole paragraph, the system as tested, but containing only the first 77 of the 79 non-conformances, is certifiable.

The problem with the whole national certification program of the EAC is that the program is built on standards that are standards in form only, without substance. Nearly every voting system currently in the field and used in elections since November 2006 was "certified" to the 2002 VSS under the previous NASED/ITA system. Nearly every voting system to be sold to counties and municipalities until 2012 (and perhaps beyond) will be "certified" to the 2005 VVSG.

The labs are quick to state that they do not certify equipment. The EAC is quick to point out that the testing is done by the labs and not by the EAC. For years the voting equipment vendors have claimed that the 2002 VSS and 2005 VVSG are "comprehensive and rigorous". This real world application of the 2002 VSS to an actual voting system by a NIST-accredited laboratory should demonstrate how toothless and ineffective the 2002 VSS and 2005 VVSG are.

As hard as this is to believe, the EAC certification program is a substantial improvement over the qualification program administered by NASED. With EAC certification, it is possible to find out the known deficiencies that are present in the system used to administer your election. How many known deficiencies are lurking within the equipment certified by NASED and currently used in an election near you? You are not allowed to know! Neither are your local election officials.

Certification test reports, listing the deficiencies of the systems certified by NASED, will never be published. This is because the reports are considered trade secrets by the vendors. The reports are also considered trade secrets by the ITA testing labs that tested the systems. Most importantly, the reports are also considered trade secrets by the chairman and every member of the NASED Voting Systems Board.

This means that systems with known deficiencies certified by NASED were sold to unsuspecting counties and municipalities. With the old NASED/ITA program, these local election officials were left in the dark and never had the opportunity to learn of known deficiencies before they used the voting systems in elections. Instead, they get to learn of the deficiencies as the systems fail during the administration of real elections in the real world.

At least, under the EAC certification system, local election officials have a chance to learn how their voting systems will fail before they use the voting system to administer a real election. This is how the certification process has “improved” under the EAC.

Is this sufficient improvement? Certainly not. Listing the known deficiencies in obscure, technical reports on a government website has some small benefit. Better still, don’t certify systems that violate the standards. Under the standards though, the NIST-accredited labs can recommend certification and the EAC can certify systems which violate most of the requirements of the standards. In my opinion the EAC should not certify such systems nor should the NIST-accredited labs make such a recommendation. But, the standards as written and enforced almost never prohibit certification of a voting system.

The central problem is that both standards (the 2002 VSS and the 2005 VVSG) allow lax and probably uneven enforcement of nearly all of the system requirements listed in the standards. This is because the loophole created by paragraph B.5 is nearly without limitation, moreover, paragraph B.5 provides no meaningful guidelines on when to enforce and when not to enforce a system requirement found in the standard. It is possible the same problem may be found in two different systems and one system is certified and the other is not.

Until this core loophole in paragraph B.5 is closed:

1. The standards do not prohibit the NIST-accredited labs from recommending the certification of a system that violates virtually any combination of requirements listed in the standards.

   
   

2. The standards do not prohibit the EAC from certifying a system that violates virtually any combination of requirements listed in the standards.

As long as a voting system does not lose or corrupt vote totals, the voting system can violate any or all other requirements listed in the standards and still be certifiable.

This is why the “standards” (2002 VSS and 2005 VVSG) used to test and certify voting systems are all form and no substance and will be without substance for the next several years.

Monday music

I thought I would try my hand at Monday Music.

I hope you enjoy this bit of the World Wide Message Tribe.

96% is closer than 87%, But not 100%

Washington State GOP Chairman, Luke Esser, has now stopped counting at 96% of the vote. this is better than 87%, but is not actually 100%.

The details are in this SeattlePI article. Here is Chairman Essers statement on this matter. Translation to me is volunteers get to count slowly and intermittently.

As near as I can tell, there are 12,970 delegates. From the numbers on the GOP website you have the following numbers.

Name	Delegates	Percentage	Difference
McCain	3,191	24.60%
Huckabee	2,898	22.34%	293
Paul	2,665	20.55%	526
Romney	1,905	14.69%	1,286
Other	136	1.05%	3,055
Uncommitted	1,656	12.77%	1,535
Uncounted	519	4.00%	2,672
Total	12,970	100.00%

Assuming the counting errors are evenly and randomly distributed (unlikely in this situation) Huckabee need to get 60% of the uncounted 519 delegates to take the lead.

I stand by my earlier assessment that Huckabee is being jobbed here.

The Washington caucuses have lesson for us here in Wisconsin. First, a spread of 25%, 22%, and 21% for first, second, and third are not the results of a race with a front runner. Two, John McCain can be stopped.

Just don't vote for him and let the convention in Minneapolis-St. Paul decide who is the nominee. Uncommitted delagate is an option This coming Tuesday.

By waiting until the convention, McCain will either prove he is sincere or pull a McCain and piss off the GOP base. For either outcome postponement the prudent course of action is to wait until September.

An Election or Annointment?

I will be honest I am not a big fan of Mike Huckabee, but he is being jobbed in Washington by the state party chair Luke Esser.

The details in the Seattle Times are here.

Here is the gist of the article. There were about 14,400 delegates casting ballots. Chairman Esser stopped the counting after 13,000 just as Senator John McCain for the first time in tallying took the lead with 242 votes. Esser declared the count (of 87%) is "as close to 100%" as we can get.

Huckabee is correct to be hopping made. 99.9% is close to 100%. 87% is not.

Chairman Esser has learned well from "Boss" Tweed of NYC Tammany Hall fame that there is "power, power, wonder-working power in the counting of the vote".

Hopefully, now that Chairman Esser has been shamed into having an election instead of an anointment, the promised final numbers will be available by 5 pm today (Monday, February 11, 2008).