I am not a Lobbist

I have the official word that if I take donations I will not have to register with the State Ethic board as a lobbist under chapter 13.62.

So I am going to put up my bleg.

With the trips to Madison, Portland and Cleveland on election integrity matters I have racked up about $950 dollars of expenses for plane fare, hotel, food, gas, copying CD's of data, etc. Now I get to add $140 for the court fee to file my Mandums request in Curciut Court of Washington County in order to get the election certification election packet from Diebold (and other vendors) released.

If what I have been doing is behavior you want to encourage then make checks payable to: John Washburn and send to N128W12795 Highland Road, Germantown WI 53022.

Nothing encourages behavior like cash and checks.

Election Fraud Committee Comes to Milwaukee

Here is the press release I received:

Contact: Brian Walsh        October 20, 2005

Phone: 202-225-6265

Fax: 202-225-3394

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Committee to Hold Congressional Field Hearing in Milwaukee Next Week

House Administration to Examine 2004 Election &Proposals for Reform

WASHINGTON D.C. – U.S. Reps. Bob Ney (OH-18) and Mark Green (WI-08), announced Thursday that the House Administration Committee, which has oversight over federal election law, will hold a Congressional field hearing in Milwaukee, next Monday, October 24^th, to examine the conduct of the 2004 election and proposals for reform.

Previous hearings examining the 2004 election were held earlier this year by the Committee in both Washington D.C. and Columbus, Ohio. The October 24^th hearing will be held in the Milwaukee Federal Building and Courthouse, Room 225, beginning at 9:00 AM.

Ney, who as Chairman of the House Administration Committee, was a co-author of the 2002 Help America Vote Act, stated, “While much of the media’s attention was focused on Ohio in the aftermath of the 2004 election, we had a situation in Wisconsin where not only was the margin of victory a great deal closer, but it now appears there were significant problems in a range of areas. It is important for the Committee, and the Congress, to take a close look at the Wisconsin experience, just as we did in Ohio earlier this year, and examine areas where its electoral system can be improved. I would like to thank my colleague, Congressman Mark Green, for his hard work in bringing attention to this matter and I look forward to his participation at Monday’s hearing.”

“Almost a year after the polls closed, there still remain serious questions about the fairness and integrity of the 2004 election in Wisconsin,” Green said. “I’m glad we are able to bring this inquiry home to the state and highlight some of the problems folks encountered last November. I’m looking forward to discussing the ‘VOTE Act’ – legislation I’ve introduced to help strengthen our electoral system – and other potential reform plans.”

The following witnesses are scheduled to testify at Monday’s hearing:

• U.S. Rep. Mark Green (WI-08)
• State Senator Joe Leibham;
• Kathy Nickloaus, Waukesha County Clerk ;
• Kevin J. Kennedy, Executive Director, State Elections Board;
• Kay Cole James, member of the Carter-Baker commission.

Following his testimony, Green will join the Committee Members in the questioning of witnesses.

Please note that additional witnesses have been invited and may be added.

###

I wish I was not in Neehan tomorrow. I would attend. It is an excellent chance to watch a white wash in real time.

Open Records Request In (Sort of)

A version of the application packet Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (DESI) submitted for certification to the State Election Board has been redacted by DESI and is available for public review.

I am pursuing my Writ of Mandamus petition to have a version which is not redacted by the Vendor. I have submitted pettions to both the dane county DA, Brian Blanchard and the Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin, Peg "the Keg" Lautenschlager. I am working on submitting MY mandamus petition to circuit court this week some time.

If I find myself in Madison though I will review the redacted version in person. But, this is unlikely as I am at a client in Neenah WI for the next several months.

Diebold Demonstration Last Wednesday

On Wednesday, October 19, 2005 Diebold and Fidlar were in Madison to show of the Diebold DRE, GEMS and Diebold optical scanners.

The display was impressive and I am confident the Election Administration Council will foolishly vote for certification of these machines.

The accuracy question was question brough up up prompted by me. She asked: "How can I sign off on the check box for accuracy when we did not do that this morning?" The staff admitted to the council they were not able to get the machine tallies to agree with the expected results of the test deck. The staff was willing to write off the discrepancy as "Tester input error". The staff was asked why the test deck was not reentered. Apparently entering the test decks was so arduous the staff was unwilling to "waste time" and actually test the accuracy of the DRE software properly.

Unfortunately, what I saw not only supported but deepened my concerns regarding testability of these machines under 5.84 and accuracy and correctness of these 2 systems (GEMS and optical scanner) under 5.91(11).

The screen, user interface, 4 point stand, and ergonomics are phenomenal on the DRE. Unfortunatey, my concerns about the machines complying with 5.91(11) and 5.84 have little to do with these flashy, but superficial externals. As much as these features improve accessibility for the disabled (blind, deaf and wheel chaired) they do for accuracy or correctness. The underlying security defects from version GEMS 1.18.17 exists in GEMS 1.18.24. The security defect in AccuVote OS Precinct Count firmware 1.94w is still present in firmware version 1.96.6. The same defect of the precinct count 1.96.6 firmware is present Central count firmware 2.0.12.

The security defect on the optical Scanners (OS) is IF the memory card can be swapped with an altered memory card, the optical scanner can do nearly nearly anything under programatic control when the zero totals or tallies total reports are invoked. The details of the security defect are described in the Hursti Report.

I am writing a report to the State Elections Board recommending against certification of the system as presented on Wednesday, October 19, 2005.

Official Response to my Diebold OR Request

I recieved the official response from the WI SEB on my 7 part OR request. Her it is in toto:

Greetings John,

Below is the information you requested in response to your open records request.

Response Q-1) Here is a list of the items submitted by the vendor with the number of pages in parentheses.
Please let know what item(s) you are interested in purchasing.

Diebold Election Systems Training Programs Brochure (3 copied pages)
Diebold Elections Systems, Inc Product Brochures (20 copied
pages)

All above information equals - 23 pages @ $0.25 per page = $ 5.75

At this time we are not adding the application letter, application
for certification of electronic voting system, ITA reports, user list
or manuals because if the confidential and proprietary notice we received from Diebold Election Systems, Inc.

Response Q-2) Records supporting the vendors claim that their voting machinery is certified under the 2002 EAC/NASED voting standards.
This information is disclosed above. Additionally, this information
can be found at the NASED website at http://www.nass.org/index.html

Response Q-3) The 2002 certification number issued.

N-1-06-22-22-001

Response Q-4) All reports and documents created by the independent testing authority (ITA) pursuant to the ITA recommendation for the issuance of the
2002 certification number.

With respect to item 4, Diebold has informed us that they take the position that the entire ITA report is exempt from your request. We are working on a response to them that states that we do not accept this position and that we will expect them to defend this position if litigation ensues. We hope to get them to provide a redacted copy of the report. (This response was copied from correspondence between Kevin J. Kennedy, Executive Director SEB and Mr. Washburn dated 9/27/05.)

Response Q-5) Name and Address of ITA testing lab

Wyle Laboratories (310) 322-1763
http://www.wylelabs.com/
Ciber, Inc. Tel: (303) 220.0100
http://ciber.com
Toll Free: (800) 242.3799

Response Q-6) Copy of the Physical Configuration Audit
This information is disclosed above. Additionally, this information
can be found at the NASED website at http://www.nass.org/index.html

Response Q-7) Copy of SEB test plan to ascertain if the system used in the mock election is the same submitted under to the ITA?

We have not developed a test plan that addresses your concerns in issue 7. (This response was copied from correspondence between Kevin J.
Kennedy, Executive Director SEB and Mr. Washburn dated 9/27/05.)

Here was my response:

Ms. Edgren:

Thank you for your exceptionally thorough and detailed response.

I maintain your response on item Q-6 is unresponsive. The reference to the NASED site is not sufficient as the information contained therein (excerpted below) is not a physical configuration audit (PCA) as defined and described in Volume I, Section 8.7.1 of the EAC VVSG (2002). GEMS software requires both Microsoft Access and a Windows operating system (either MS windows or WinCE). Neither are listed on the NASED site, but are required as part of an 8.7.1 PCA. Therefore, the NASED reference is not the PCA for the system submitted for qualification under the EAC 2002 guidelines.

There is an item missing from the Diebold application for certification. Diebold is required to submit 2 ITA reports not one; one report from Wyle for the hardware and one report from Ciber for the software. Are these 2 ITA reports combined into a single report? Your email lists 2 ITA's but mentions only one report instead of 2?

The NASED certification process outline here: http://www.nased.org/ITA%20Information/NASEDITAProcess.pdf makes it clear there MUST be 2 ITA reports if any portion of the software is not burned into read-only memory (ROM). The need for 2 ITA reports is re-iterated in the EAC 2002 qualification guidelines under the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG). The VVSG (2002) can be found at: http://www.glynn.com/eac_vvsg/guide_toc.asp

In summary:
Thank you again for your detailed response. There still remains a small point of confusion. Are both of the required ITA reports in the possession of the staff of the Wisconsin State Elections Board?